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NOTES AND COMMENTS
5. Evidence of tax avoidance motive may still be fatal 4 6
6. Generally the courts have caught the spirit of Culbertson re-
markably well. Although numerical weight settles nothing, it may
be noted that the majority of decisions since Culbertson have been
favorable to the taxpayer; decidedly the opposite was true pre-
viously.
Two cases which seem to prescribe typically the limits under Cul-
bertson deserve special notice. The court in Morrison v. Cominis-
sioner4T denied validity where, though the formalities of agreement were
indulged in, the taxpayer retained domination over the business, provid-
ing no separation of earnings nor power of ostensible partners to draw
checks on the account. In Ginsberg v. Arnold4" the interest of the son
was a direct gift; the father exercised control over the writing of checks;
the son was in the Army during the tax years. Yet on rehearing the
circuit court found an intent to create a partnership for the benefit of
the business.
In order to encourage this socially desirable method of perpetuating
the family business; in order to reduce the inequality in the effect given
intra-family transfers within corporations and in partnerships;49 in
order to recognize the very real consequences of a genuine commercial
partnership, perhaps parent-child partnership will be viewed more fa-
vorably by the courts under the impetus of the Culbertson case.50
HUBERT B. HuMPHREY, JR.
Torts--Unborn Child-Right of Action
for Prenatal Injury
A search through the North Carolina Digest, Reports, and Anno-
tated General Statutes has disclosed no North Carolina case in which
an action has been brought by or on behalf of a child for prenatal in-
juries. A probable reason for this situation is that, by the decided pre-
ponderance of case authority, no right of action has been recognized for
"Grayson v. Deal, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx RzP. §9408 (N. D. Ala. 1949).
'7 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9436 (2d Cir. 1949).
AS5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9396 (5th Cir. 1949), vacating on rehearing 5
CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9381 (5th Cir.); accord: 0. H. Delchamps, 5 CCH
1949 FED. TAX REP. §7560 (T. C. 1949). But cf. Lusthaus v. Comm'r., 327 U.S.
293 (1946).
' There is evidence, however, of the beginnings of a movement to reduce the
transfer rights within a corporation to the partnership level. See Alexandre, The
Corporate Counterpart of the Family Partnership, 2 TAx L. REv. 493 (1947).
" Congressional action has been suggested to tax the income of parents and
minor children as a unit or to deal with the family partnership problem as a whole.
See Wales, The 1949 Relevance of the Revenue Bill of 1948, 62 HARv. L. REv.
957, 972-74 (1949).
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physical disability' or wrongful death2 of a child for injuries received
before birth. Legal writers, however, who have discussed the problem
have been almost unanimously in favor of recognizing such a right of
action.8 The purpose of this note is to summarize briefly the law on
this subject in the light of recent decisions, and to consider the possible
effect of these decisions on the law of North Carolina.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently held that a viable4 child
which is injured while en ventre sa mere and which survives the injury
has an action for personal disability suffered by reason of the negligence
of another.5 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in a decision handed
down two days later, held that the personal representative of an unborn
viable child whose death is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful
acts or omissions of the physician in charge of the mother and of the
hospital in which she was confined may maintain an action therefor,
under the wrongful death statute6 of that state, on behalf of the next of
kin of such deceased child.7
Two reasons are usually advanced by those courts which refuse to
allow recovery by the child. First, there is no person in existence at
the time of the injury to whom the defendant owes a duty of care.8
Second, there seems to be a widespread fear of fraudulent suits because
of the difficulty of proof of any causal connection between the tortious
act and the resulting damage.9
1 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 IIl. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900) ; Smith v.
Luckhardt, 299 IIl. App. 100, 19 N. E. 2d 446 (1939); Stemmer v. Kline, 128
N. J. L. 455, 26 A 2d 489 (1942) ; Ryan v. Public Service Coordinated Transport,
18 N. J. Misc. 429, 14 A. 2d 52 (1940) ; Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133
N. E. 567 (1921) ; Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940);
Lewis v. Steve's Sash & Door Co., 177 S. W. 2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944);
Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916 (1916).
2Stanford v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926) ; Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. St. Rep. 242 (1884) ; New-
man v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N. W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Ry., 248
Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71 (1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 Atd. 704
(1901); Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. 2d
944 (1935).
'Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CALIF.
L. REv. 461 (1922); Anderson, Rights of Action of an Unborn Child, 14 TENN.
L. REv. 151 (1936) ; Frey, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 12 ST. Louis
L. RFv. 85 (1927) ; Kerr, Action by Unborn Infant, 61 CENT. L. J. 364 (1905) ;
Morris, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 58 CENT. L. J. 143 (1904);
Straub, Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries, 33 LAw NoTEs 205 (1930) ; Notes,
28 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1939), 6 CORI. L. Q. 341 (1921), 34 HARV. L. REv. 549
(1921), 36 MICH. L. REv. 512 (1938), 20 MINN. L. Rav. 321 (1936), [1949] U.
OF ILL. LAW FORUm 537, 44 YALE L. 3. 1468 (1935).
' "Capable of living; physically fitted to live; of a fetus, having reached such
a stage of development as to permit continued existence, under normal conditions,
outside of the womb." THE NEW CENTuuRY DICTIONARY, Vol. II, p. 2143 (1938).
r Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334(1949).
'MINN. STAT. §573.02 (1945).
Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N. W. 2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
, Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900).
' "And it is easy to see on what a boundless sea of speculation in evidence this
new idea would launch us." Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L. R. Ir. 69 (1891).
[Vol. 28
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An examination of the first reason indicates that it is not well
founded from the standpoint of medical science, especially if a distinc-
tion is made between a nonviable child and a viable child. A viable
child is more than just a "part" of the mother. It has its own bodily
form and members, manifests all the anatomical characteristics of indi-
viduality, possesses its own circulatory, vascular and excretory systems,
and is at the time of the injury capable of being ushered into the visible
world.10 From the legal standpoint, other fields of law have long rec-
ognized the rights of an unborn infant. The criminal law regards it as
a separate entity.11 A posthumous child has been allowed to participate
in the recovery for the wrongful death of its father,i s and in the law
of property it is considered in esse for all purposes beneficial to it.'1
If an unborn child is, in contemplation of law, considered a human being
for these purposes, consistency would seem to require that it be con-
sidered a human being for the more important purpose of redressing
wrongs committed against it.
Turning to the second reason advanced, difficulty of medical proof
in cases of this nature must be recognized. Pathologists readily a'dmit
that it is impossible in many instances for medical science to establish
with any degree of certainty the causal connection between prenatal
injury and subsequent physical disability or death. However, at least in
some cases, this connection can be definitely established.' 4 It is ele-
mentary that if a wrong has been committed, there should be a remedy.
A high standard of medical proof would preclude any justifiable fear
of fraudulent suits, and at the same time permit recovery in those cases
where a causal connection can be shown with reasonable certainty.
It would seem then that the Supreme Courts of Ohio and Minnesota
have adopted the better view. They have definitely followed the modern
trend. 15 The cases in both courts were decided on demurrer and uphold
a right of action in the unborn child for prenatal injuries. The opinions
of both cases indicate that the courts were concerned primarily with the
" Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946).
"1 Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898) ; State v. Waiters, 199 Wis.
68, 225 N. W. 167 (1929).
" Herndon v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 37 Okla. 256, 128 Pac. 727 (1912).
3 Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 52 S. E. 201 (1905) ; Biggs v. McCarty,
86 Ind. 352, 44 Am. Rep. 320 (1882). For discussions of the rights of the unborn
child in various fields of law, see Notes, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 107 (1939), E1949]
U. OF ILL. LAW FoRuM 537, 44 YALE L. J. 1468 (1935).
"Rex. v. Senior, 168 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1832) ; GLAISTER, MEDICAL JURISPRU-
DENCE & ToxIcoLOGY 320 (7th ed. 1942) ; MALOY, LEGAL ANAToY & SURGERY 685(1930); Winfield, The Unborn Child, 4 U. OF TORONTO L. J. 278, 293 (1942).
" Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946) ; Montreal Tramways v.
Leveille, 4 D. L. R. 337 (1933) ; See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359,
368, 56 N. E. 638, 640 (1900) ; Stemmer v. Kline, 19 N. J. Misc. 15, 17 A. 2d 58(1940) (allowing recovery), reversed, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942)
(9-6 decision).
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legal rights involved and that neither the fear of fraudulent suits nor
the difficulty of medical proof has influenced these decisions.
The Ohio Court found that an unborn infant is a person within the
meaning -of Section 16 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which
requires that "all courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his Jan'd, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of Jaw, and shall have justice administered without denial
or delay." Once this conclusion is reached, there is no need for legis-
lative action to confer on the child a right to sue in tort for prenatal
injuries. The North Carolina Constitution has precisely the same pro-
vision as that relied on by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 16
The M.innesota Court recognizes that an unborn viable child is a
person by allowing the personal representative of such child to sue under
the ,Minnesota wrongful death statute. That statute provides in part:
"When 'death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person
or corporation, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain
an action therefor if he might have maintained an action, had he lived,
for an injury caused by the same act or omission." The Court expresses
the view that "it seems too plain for argument that where independent
existence is possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful act a cause
of action arises under the statutes cited." The North Carolina wrong-
ful death statute is very similar in its terms to that of Minnesota.1 7
The unborn child is far from a nonentity in North Carolina. The
abortion statute' 8 was designed to .protect the child en ventre sa inere.
In property law it may take by deed'9 or by descent.20 A trustee must
be appointed to protect the interest of the child in esse in the sale of a
remainder.21 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized
that an unborn infant may be regarded as having a separate existence.
Mr. Justice Winborne states, "The question then arises as to how far
the pregnancy should be advanced before the child is capable of being
destroyed. The general rule is that the child with which the woman is
pregnant must be so far advanced as to be regarded in law as having a
separate existence-a life capable of being destroyed. ' 22
It is to be noted that the Ohio case decides only that an unborn child
N. C. CowsT. Art. I, §35.
'
7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943).
'IN. C. GN. STAT. §14-44 (1943); State v. Jordon, 227 N. C. 579, 42 S. E.
2d 674 (1947).
11 N. C. GEa. STAT. §41-5 (1943); Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 52
S. E. 201 (1905); Heath v. Heath, 114 N. C. 547, 19 S. E. 155 (1894).20 Deal v. Sexton, 144 N. C. 157, 56 S. E. 691 (1907).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-11 (1943); Butler v. Winston, 223 N. C. 421, 27 S. E.
2d 124 (1943) ; McAfee v. Green,.143 N. C. 411, 55 S. E. 828 (1906).2 State v. Forte, 222 N. C. 537, 538, 23 S. E. 2d 842, 843 (1943) quoting with
approval Foster v. State, 182 Wis. 298, 196 N. W. 233 (1923) to the effect that




may recover for injuries to it if it was capable of living at the time of
the injury and has demonstrated its capacity to survive by surviving.
The Minnesota case goes further in allowing an action for the wrongful
death of the child. Talks with pathologists have indicated that proof
that the injury caused the death of the child would be no more difficult
than proof that the injury caused subsequent physical damage. In the
latter case, the additional problem arises of determining whether or not
the child was viable at the time of the injury; that is, was the child
capable of surviving outside the womb so as to bring it within the defi-
nition of a person? That problem is not insurmountable, and consistent
judicial reasoning would seem to require that there be a right of action
for the wrongful death of the child as well as for physical disability.
Medical proof, or the absence of medical proof, must eventually de-
termine whether or not there can be a recovery for physical disability
or wrongful death from prenatal injuries. In spite of the fact that on
many occasions a causal connection undoubtedly will be impossible defi-
nitely to establish, it is submitted that an unborn child which has reached
the viable stage in the pregnancy period is more than just a part of the
mother but has a separate existence, and that it should not be denied
the right to go into the Courts of North Carolina or of any other juris-
diction to claim redress for personal injuries inflicted on it before birth.
W. BRAXTON SCHELL.
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